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SECURITIES LAW 
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. 
RIND: SEC CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
ARE NOT SUBJECT TO STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Securities & Exchange Commission v. Rind,l the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, ruling on an 
issue of first impression,2 held that civil enforcement actions3 
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinaf-
ter "SEC") are not subject to statute of limitations restric-
tions.4 Additionally, the court ruled that no right to a jury 
trial attaches in SEC civil enforcement actions seeking 
disgorgement of illicit profits.5 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On August 15, 1990, the SEC filed a civil enforcement 
action in connection with the collapse of ZZZZ Best Company.6 
1. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 439 
(1993) (per Wallace, J., the other panel members were Trott, J. and Nelson, J.). 
2. [d. at 1488. 
3. Section 20 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21 of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 !hereinafter "1933 Act" and "1934 Act," respectively), 
authorize the SEC's use of the civil courts to enforce Act provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 
77t(b) (1988), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988). 
4. [d. at 1493. 
5. [d. Disgorgement deprives a wrongdoer of illegally obtained profits, often 
compensating victims for losses. [d. at 1490. 
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In the action, the SEC named Maurice Rind, along with thir-
teen others, as defendants.7 The complaint was brought under 
Section 20 of the Securities Act of 1933 (hereinafter "1933 
Act") and Section 21 of the Securities Act of 1934 (hereinafter II 
1934 Act").8 The SEC alleged violations of various reporting 
and recordkeeping provisions of the 1933 Act,9 the 1934 ActIo 
and various SEC Rules. 11 
The SEC alleged that Rind violated securities regulations 
by concocting a fraudulent transaction which vastly overstated 
the assets of ZZZZ Best Company in the company's registration 
statements.12 The alleged overstatement enabled the company 
to raise millions of dollars in capital.13 According to the com-
plaint, Rind personally received at least $700,000 for his part 
in the fraud. l4 
The SEC sought disgorgement of Rind's unlawful gains 
and a permanent injunction prohibiting his further violation of 
federal securities provisions.15 Rind moved for judgment on 
the pleadings, arguing that, under Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, 
Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson,16 the SEC action was barred 
by the statute of limitations.17 The district court denied Rind's 
439 (1993). 
7. [d. Prior to trial, the thirteen other defendants either defaulted or consent-
ed to judgments, leaving Rind as the sole defendant in the case. [d. at 1488. 
8. [d. 
9. [d. Rind was charged with violating Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, which 
forbids a seller of securities to use misleading statements, fraud or deceit in inter-
state transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988). 
10. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1488. Rind was charged with violating Section lO(b) of 
the 1934 Act, which prohibits the use of misleading statements, deceptive schemes 
,or fraudulent practices by persons buying or selling securities in interstate com-
merce, and by national securities exchanges. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). 
11. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1488. Specifically, Rules 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5), 
12b-20 (17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20), 13a-13 (17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13), and 13b-1 (17 
C.F.R. § 240.13b-1). 




16. 501 U.S. 350 (1991). In Lampf, the Supreme Court held that an action 
brought by private investors under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act was subject to a 
one-year statute of limitations with a three-year period of repose (i.e., one year 
from the date fraud is detected, and three years from when it occurred) [d. at 
364. 
17. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1488. Rind argued that July, 1987, the date ZZZZ Best 
2
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motion and granted the SEC's motion to strike Rind's statute 
of limitations defenses. 18 The district court also granted the 
SEC's motion to strike Rind's demand for a jury trial, on the 
grounds that disgorgement is an equitable remedy. 19 Rind 
appealed these rulings interlocutorily, and the court certified 
the statute of limitations and the jury trial questions for ap-
peaL20 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit granted permission to appeal. 21 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Rind, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that no statute of limitations applies to civil enforcement 
actions brought by the SEC.22 The court also held that the 
right to a jury trial does not attach in actions where the SEC 
sues for disgorgement of illegal profits.23 
A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
In addressing the issue of whether SEC civil enforcement 
actions are subject to a statute of limitations, the Ninth Circuit 
considered the Supreme Court's ruling in Lampf,24 and held 
that Lampf was inapplicable.25 The court then determined 
that, in light of Congress' intene6 and public policy inter-
ests,27 a statute of limitations period does not apply to SEC 
Company filed for bankruptcy, was the latest date the fraud can be said to have 
occurred. The SEC's action was filed more than three years later, in August, 1990. 
[d. at 1488. 
18. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1488. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. An interlocutory appeal is one brought prior to final adjucation of a 
case "which is not determinable of the controversy, but which is necessary for a 
suitable adjudication of the merits." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 815 (6th ed. 1990). 
21. [d. 
22. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1492 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
439 (1993). 
23. [d. at 1493. 
24. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 
(1991). 
25. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993). 
26. [d. 
27. [d at 1492. 
3
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enforcement actions. 28 
1. Lampf Applies Only to Private Actions Implied Under 
Section 10(b) 
Responding to Rind's assertion that, under Lampf, the 
SEC is bound by a statute of limitations period when it sues 
for disgorgement of profits, the Ninth Circuit determined that 
Lampf is not dispositive in this case.29 The court stated that 
Lampf applies only to private actions implied under Section 
10(b) of the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934.30 
Lampf involved an action brought by a group of investors 
under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.3t Such private 10(b) ac-
tions were not expressly created by Congress, but were later 
implied by the courtS.32 The issue in Lampf was whether a 
statute of limitations should control private actions implied 
under Section 10(b).33 The Lampf Court noted that the policy 
considerations underlying Congress' decision to impose time 
limitations on other private actions expressly authorized in the 
1934 Act would also apply to the private actions implied by the 
courtS.34 Therefore, the Lampf Court held that the same re-
strictions placed by Congress on the expressly created private 
rights of actions would also control private actions implied 
under Section 10(b).35 
In Rind, however, the Ninth Circuit refused to extend the 
Lampf opinion to public claims brought under Section 20 of the 
1933 Act and Section 21 of the 1934 Act.36 The court noted 
the differences in the policy considerations underlying private 
and public actions.37 Private actions were created to protect 
28. Id. 
29. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993). 
30. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1490. 
31. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 353. 
32. Id. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bakers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 
n.9 (1971). 
33. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 353. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1490. 
37. Id. 
4
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individual investors from stock manipulations schemes and to 
compensate them by restoring losses.3s In contrast, civil en-
forcement actions are concerned with deterring wrongdoers 
and depriving them of their unlawful profits.39 The court not-
ed that these social policies are "independent of the claims of 
individual investors,,40 and that, despite the monetary aspect 
of disgorgement, its purpose, to remove the incentive for violat-
ing securities regulations, is public in nature.41 The court con-
cluded that, because the interests are different for public ac-
tions, the time limits extended to implied private rights by the 
Supreme Court in Lampf, do not apply to civil enforcement ac-
tions brought by the SEC.42 
2. Congress Did Not Intend for a Statute of Limitations to 
Apply to SEC Enforcement Actions 
The Ninth Circuit determined that Congress did not in-
tend for SEC enforcement actions to be subject to time restric-
tions.43 The court pointed to the structure of the securities 
laws as evidence of this intention.44 The private actions ex-
pressly created in the 1933 and 1934 Acts are all bound by 
express statutes of limitation.45 In contrast, Congress imposed 
no time restrictions on SEC enforcement actions it autho-
rized.46 As a result, the Rind court determined that the struc-
ture of the securities laws indicates that Congress deliberately 
refrained from imposing time restrictions on SEC civil enforce-
ment actions.47 . 
Recognizing that Congress has often refrained from impos-
ing time restrictions on federal claims it has created, the Rind 




41. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1490. 
42. Id. 
43. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993). 
44.Id. 
45. Id. 
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) and U.S.C. §78u(d) (1988). 
47. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1990. 
5
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arising from those claims.48 The Court has held that general-
ly, when Congress is silent as to a statute of limitations, a 
court should borrow the limitation period provided in an analo-
gous rule. 49 This doctrine, however, is not applied in cases 
where the government sues to protect a public right or inter-
est.50 The underlying justification for exempting federal 
claims from the general rule is that the public should not suf-
fer due to the failure of public officials to enforce laws in a 
timely manner.51 Civil enforcement claims are brought by the 
SEC to protect the public interest by ensuring the integrity 
and fairness of the capital markets.52 Therefore, the Rind 
court held that Congress did not intend for these actions to be 
subject to statute of limitations restrictions.53 
Finally, the court noted that the nature of SEC enforce-
ment claims indicates that Congress did not intend for these 
claims to be time-barred.54 The court relied on Occidental Life 
Ins. Co. v. EEOC,55 where the Supreme Court refused to place 
time restrictions on employment discrimination claims brought 
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinaf-
ter "EEOC,,).56 The Court stated that to do so would "frustrate 
or interfere with th.e implementation of national policies."57 
The Court noted that the EEOC was required by law to at-
tempt to settle potential claims before suing. 58 Furthermore, 
the EEOC faced a severe backlog of cases when Congress first 
authorized EEOC enforcement actions. 59 These two factors 
indicated to the Court that Congress could not have intended 
48. [d. 
49. 1d. (citing Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 323-24 (1989) 
(holding that claims brought under 101(a)(2) of Title I of the federal Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 are governed by statute of limita-
tions restrictions contained in applicable state personal injury statutes». 1d. at 
323. 
50. U.S. v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940). 
51. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1490 (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. U.S., 304 U.S. 126, 
132 (1938». 
52. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1491. 
53. 1d. 
54. 1d. 
55. 432 U.S. 355 (1977). 
56. 1d. at 372. 
57. 1d. at 367. 
58. 1d. at 368. 
59. Id. at 369-71. 
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for the EEOC to be subject to stringent time constraints.6o 
Similarly, the Rind court stated that the nature of SEC 
enforcement actions indicates that Congress did not intend for 
them to be subject to a statute of limitations.61 Investigations 
of securities laws violations are often arduous and time-con-
suming.62 The SEC often attempts to avoid litigation by set-
tling claims administratively, a process which requires consid-
erable time.63 Furthermore, enforcement actions may involve 
multiple parties and complex transactions, and fraud is often 
difficult to detect.64 The Rind court noted all of these factors 
and concluded that the nature of SEC enforcement actions 
indicates that Congress could not have intended to subject 
them to strict time restrictions.65 
B. JURY TRIAL 
The Ninth Circuit joined the Second Circuit66 in holding 
that the right to a jury trial does not attach to SEC civil en-
forcement actions seeking disgorgement of unlawful profits.67 
Noting the settled rule that no jury trial attaches to purely 
injunctive actions brought by the SEC,68 the court extended 
the rule to include enforcement actions seeking disgorgement 
of profits.69 
The court based its ruling on the fact that, despite its 
monetary nature, disgorgement of profits has been held to 
constitute an equitable remedy.70 In Securities and Exchange 
60. Occidental, 432 U.S. at 372. 





66. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978). In 
Commonwealth, the Second Circuit, characterizing disgorgement of profits as an 
exercise of the court's discretion in preventing unjust enrichment, ruled that no 
right to a jury trial existed in an SEC enforcement action seeking disgorgement of 
profits. [d. at 95. 
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Comm'n v. Clark,71 the Ninth Circuit characterized 
disgorgement of profits as injunctive in nature.72 Also, the 
Supreme Court has noted that disgorgement actions are equi-
table in nature.73 
Finally, the court cited the similarity between 
disgorgement and the more traditional equitable remedy of 
restitution.74 Because the right to jury trial guaranteed by the 
Seventh Amendmenf5 does not attach in equitable actions, 
the court held that a wrongdoer charged under an SEC 
disgorgement action is not entitled to a jury tria1.76 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit held that civil enforcement claims 
brought by the SEC are not subject to statute of limitations 
restrictions. The court based its decision on the important pub-
lic policies underlying enforcement claims, the intent of Con-
gress as evidenced by the structure of the securities laws, and 
the complex nature of SEC enforcement claims. In addition, 
the Rind court held that, due to the equitable nature of 
disgorgement, a defendant's right to a jury trial does not at-
tach in SEC civil enforcement actions which seek disgorgement 
of profits. 
Joan E. Low' 
71. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990). 
72. [d. at 453. 
73. See Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 
570 (1990). 
74. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1493. 
75. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
76. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1493. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996. 
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